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4.1 Introduction
The pension debate in France has essentially focused, until recently,
upon ways of ﬁnancing retirement, with a strong opposition between sup-
porters of maintaining the quasi-exclusivity for pay-as-you-go (PAYG) ﬁ-
nancing and supporters of a progressive introduction of funded pensions,
in addition to the existing PAYG basic and complementary schemes. How-
ever, attention has shifted recently toward another variable of adjustment
to the new demographic context, which is the age at retirement or, more
widely, the age at exit from the labor force (Bommier, Magnac, and Roger
2001). The mean age at retirement in France is in the lower tail of the Eu-
ropean distribution and has kept on diminishing for the past twenty years
for two main reasons.
• The incentive structure of the pension system, itself creates issues, es-
pecially since the introduction of the retraite à 60 ans. Until 1982, the
ﬁrst age of eligibility to social security (SS) beneﬁts was sixty-ﬁve, and
it was shifted to sixty for all wage earners in 1983. Retirement before
reaching a total tenure of 37.5 years remained strongly penalized in
the régime général,which covers about 65 percent of wage earners, but
this constraint did not bind most older male workers (since they often
4
Estimating Models of Retirement
Behavior on French Data
Ronan Mahieu and Didier Blanchet
Ronan Mahieu manages the Department of Statistics and Research of the Caisse Nationale
des Allocations Familiales (a subdivision of the French social security system that pays fam-
ily beneﬁts). Didier Blanchet is head of the Department of Employment and Labor Income
Statistics at the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), Paris.
We thank the Direction de la Recherche, des Etudes, de l’Evaluation et des Statistiques
(DREES) for access to data from the Echantillon Interrégime de Retraités.We also thank Béa-
trice Sedillot, Thierry Magnac, and Guy Laroque for their useful comments. The usual dis-
claimer applies.began to work about age ﬁfteen) and thus did not prevent a continu-
ous decline in participation rates.
• The relative generosity of unemployment beneﬁts or early retirement
provisions before this age of sixty is the second reason. As unemploy-
ment rose in the 1970s, the generosity of these schemes was expanded,
allowing people aged between sixty and sixty-ﬁve to retire. When the
early retirement age was set at sixty, unemployment or early retire-
ment provisions were targeted at people aged ﬁfty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-nine,
whose participation rates also sharply decreased.
Age at retirement appears to be the key economic variable for potential
adjustments. A ﬁrst step in the direction of increasing employment rates
was the 1993 reform of the régime général, which planned a progressive
strengthening of the conditions giving access to “normal” (full-rate) re-
tirement at age sixty: The previous condition was the accumulation of at
least 150 quarters (or 37.5 years) of contributions to pension schemes. This
threshold progressively increases to reach 160 quarters (i.e., forty years)
from 2003. One of the propositions discussed in the Charpin report
(Charpin 1999; ordered by the prime minister) is to go further in the same
direction, raising this threshold to 170 quarters.
Of course, modifying this state of aﬀairs raises many issues. Early re-
tirement policies are historically a response to an employment shortage,
and it is often feared that less permissive policies may worsen the situation
on the labor market. Conversely, policies of early withdrawal from the la-
bor force have never proved to be of any help in mitigating employment
problems (unemployment reached a peak at 12.4 percent of the labor
force in 1997, which was high compared to other European countries).
Another issue is identifying the best way to induce people to leave the la-
bor force later. A ﬁrst possibility is coercion. A second one preferably re-
lies on incentives, with the idea to compensate for the desired increase of
the average retirement age by the introduction of more ﬂexibility in this re-
tirement age (Taddei 2000). This is speciﬁcally the option proposed by the
Charpin report, which suggests to compensate for the strengthening of
conditions necessary to get a normal pension at age sixty with a reduction
of penalties associated with either anticipating or postponing retirement.
The French system is characterized by a strong deviation from marginal
actuarial fairness, and the proposition consists in bringing it closer to this
rule.
This context calls for closer inspection on what factors determine retire-
ment behavior, from both demand and supply sides. The analysis pre-
sented below will essentially focus on supply-side eﬀects, although we shall
try, systematically, to remind the reader of the importance of the demand
side.
We shall proceed in ﬁve steps. We shall ﬁrst recall the features of the
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the paper (section 4.2). The analysis will concentrate on two subpopula-
tions: wage earners belonging to the private sector and civil servants. We
shall give a detailed account of rules governing pensions for these two cat-
egories, including possibilities of early exit from the labor force, through ei-
ther early retirement or speciﬁc features of unemployment insurance.
We shall then describe data sets that are used and explain why we focused
the analysis on three speciﬁc cohorts: cohort 1930 for workers in the pri-
vate sector and cohorts 1930 and 1932 for civil servants (section 4.3). We
shall then move to a descriptive analysis of incentives to withdraw from the
labor force that applied to these cohorts, given their speciﬁc histories. This
analysis completes the one performed earlier on this speciﬁc sample by
Blanchet and Pelé (1999; section 4.4).
These incentives will then be introduced in probit models of withdrawal
from the labor force (section 4.5). Section 4.6, at last, will present simula-
tions derived from these models.
4.2 Basic Facts about the French Pension System
4.2.1 The General Structure
The French system is complex, but its structure can nevertheless be
summed up quite simply. For a large part of the population (wage earners
in the private sector), pensions rely on two compulsory pillars.
• The basic general scheme (SS) oﬀers beneﬁts corresponding to the
share of gross wages below a SS ceiling (€2,352 per month in 2002). In
1992, 70.5 percent of people aged sixty or older received beneﬁts from
this general scheme. On the contributors’ side, in the same year, the
general scheme gathered 64.8 percent of the labor force.
• Complementary schemes are organized on a occupational basis. They
consist of a large number (about 180) of speciﬁc schemes that are fed-
erated in two main organisms, ensuring interscheme demographic
compensation: the Association Générale des Institutions de Retraite
des Cadres (AGIRC) for executive workers, which applies only to the
fraction of their wages over the SS ceiling, and the Association des
Régimes de Retraite Complémentaire (ARRCO) for other workers’
and executives’ wages below the ceiling. In 1972, contributing to a
complementary scheme became compulsory. Today, complementary
schemes provide 40 percent of pensions for wage earners in the private
sector. Receiving a complementary pension is conditioned on receiv-
ing SS beneﬁts.
Besides this simple two-pillar structure, the complexity of the French
system is essentially due to the existence of a large number of exceptions to
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tors. When SS was created in 1945, people who already beneﬁted from
more generous dispositions refused to join the new system (for instance
civil servants or people employed in large state-owned companies). Con-
versely some categories chose cheaper systems oﬀering lower protection
because they thought that a large part of their retirement needs was likely
to be covered by other sources, such as professional assets for the self-
employed. Besides the two-pillar system constituted by the general scheme
and ARRCO and AGIRC, there are a multiplicity of speciﬁc schemes (e.g.,
those for civil servants and the self-employed) applying speciﬁc rules. In
particular, it must be observed that civil servants are not really covered by
an autonomous pension system, since their pensions are directly paid on
the state budget.
For all categories of people, there is, at last, a system of old-age mini-
mum allowance (minimum vieillesse), which is a means-tested allowance
available for people aged sixty-ﬁve or older. The population beneﬁting
from this minimum pension has regularly declined in the past, due to the
increasing maturity of normal pensions. It is now slightly below 1 million,
compared to 2.55 million in 1959 (Commissariat Général du Plan 1995).
The following analysis will deal with two subpopulations: wage earners
from the private sector and civil servants. We now give more details about
the computation of pensions for these two categories.
4.2.2 Wage Earners in the Private Sector: Rules for the General Regime
The basic general scheme oﬀers contributory beneﬁts corresponding to
the share of wages below the SS ceiling. The SS beneﬁts are proportional
to the number of quarters of contribution to the system (truncated to Nmax
quarters), and to a reference wage that, until 1993, has been the average
wage of the D best years of the pensioners’ career (past nominal wages be-
ing reevaluated at time of liquidation according to a set of retrospective
coeﬃcients). The equation giving the initial pension level is therefore
(1) Pension      
  (average wage of the D best years)
with the proportionality coeﬃcient   being itself modulated. It is maximal
when the pensioner leaves at age sixty, with N  max quarters of contributions
or more to all pension schemes: In that case, its value is set at 50 percent,
and this exactly ensures a replacement rate of the reference wage (not nec-
essarily the last wage) equal to 50 percent. The same value of  also applies
whatever the number of years contributed when the individual leaves at age
sixty-ﬁve. In all other cases, the coeﬃcient is reduced (table 4.1)
N of quarters, truncated to Nmax     
Nmax
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value of N  max quarters;
• Or by 1.25 percentage point for each quarter missing to reach age
sixty-ﬁve, the adjustment actually applied being the one that leads to
the most favorable outcome for the pensioner (see table 4.1).
For cohorts born before 1934, N  max  Nmax  150. Access to the full rate
is also possible before sixty-ﬁve for people having less than 150 quarters if
they are considered as disabled or suﬀer from handicap.
Values of N  max and D are currently changing, while Nmax remains set at
150. As mentioned in the introduction, the value of N  max should reach 160
quarters when the 1993 reform fully produces its eﬀects (cohorts born from
1943). The same reform also scheduled a progressive increase of D, up to
twenty-ﬁve years (to be reached for cohorts born from 1948). But for the
cohorts considered here, the rules are the ones that prevailed between 1983
(when the possibility of retiring at age sixty was generalized) and 1993—
that is, N  max equals 150 (37.5 years) and D equals ten years.
This system means that the number of years of contributions aﬀects the
pension level in two ways, which may imply, in some cases, a very strong de-
pendency between the age at retirement and the level of SS beneﬁts. To pro-
vide a full understanding of this interaction, table 4.2 shows the conse-
quences of this system, with pre-1993 parameters, for three reference cases
with individuals arriving at age sixty with, respectively, twenty-ﬁve, thirty,
and thirty-ﬁve years of contribution.
• The ﬁrst individual has to wait until age sixty-ﬁve to get retirement at
a full rate   (50 percent). Nevertheless, their pension is reduced by the
fact that they only have 120 quarters of contribution at this age. Their
replacement ratio is therefore only equal to four-ﬁfths (120 quarters
divided by 150) of the maximum replacement ratio, which is equal to
50 percent. Note that, at each age lower than sixty-ﬁve, the downward
adjustment of   is here computed on the basis of the number of years
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Table 4.1 Value of   Depending on Age at Receipt of First Beneﬁt and N, Number
of Quarters of Contribution to the General Regime
Age (%)
N 60 61 62 63 64 65
32.5 25 30 35 40 45 50
33.5 30 30 35 40 45 50
34.5 35 35 35 40 45 50
35.5 40 40 40 40 45 50
36.5 45 45 45 45 45 50
 37.5 50 50 50 50 50 50needed to reach age sixty-ﬁve, rather than the number of quarters
missing to reach a value of Nequal to 150, since the rule consists in ap-
plying the most advantageous of the two adjustments.
• The second individual also has to wait until age sixty-ﬁve to get the full
rate  , but beneﬁts at this age are at a higher replacement rate, equal
to fourteen-ﬁfteenths (120 quarters divided by 150) of the maximum
replacement ratio of 50 percent. In this case again the downward ad-
justment before age sixty-ﬁve is based on the number of years needed
to reach this age of sixty-ﬁve.
• The third person will not have to wait until age sixty-ﬁve. They bene-
ﬁt from the maximum replacement rate as soon as they reach a cumu-
lated number of years of contributions equal to 150 (i.e. at sixty-two-
and-one-half years). If they decide to leave between age sixty and this
sixty-two-and-one-half years, the downward adjustment will then be
computed according to the number of years missing to reach the total
of 150 contributed quarters, rather than the number of years needed to
reach age sixty-ﬁve, since the ﬁrst rule is now the most generous. Note
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Table 4.2 Replacement Rate Provided by the General Regime and the Civil Servants Regime
for Three Reference Cases
  (General   (Civil No. of Replacement Ratio Replacement Ratio
Retime) Servants) Years/ (General Regime) (Civil Servants)
Tenure (%) (%) 37.5 (%) (%)
Age (years) (1) (2) (3) (1)   (3) (2)   (3)
Individual A
60 25 25 75 0.667 16.7 50.0
61 26 30 75 0.693 20.8 52.0
62 27 35 75 0.720 25.2 54.0
63 28 40 75 0.747 29.9 56.0
64 29 45 75 0.773 34.8 58.0
65 30 50 75 0.800 40.0 60.0
Individual B
60 30 25 75 0.800 20.0 60.0
61 31 30 75 0.827 24.8 62.0
62 32 35 75 0.853 29.9 64.0
63 33 40 75 0.880 35.2 66.0
64 34 45 75 0.907 40.8 68.0
65 35 50 75 0.933 46.7 70.0
Individual C
60 35 37.5 75 0.933 35.0 70.0
61 36 42.5 75 0.960 40.8 72.0
62 37 47.5 75 0.987 46.9 74.0
63 38 50 75 1.000 50.0 75.0
64 39 50 75 1.000 50.0 75.0
65 40 50 75 1.000 50.0 75.0also that, for this person, working past sixty-two-and-one-half years
does not increase their SS entitlements.
Some additional observations must be added to this presentation of the
general scheme.
• Some people were successively aﬃliated to diﬀerent schemes, espe-
cially in older cohorts (for instance, people transiting from agriculture
or self-employment to the status of wage earner in the industry or in
services). These people will cumulate two basic pensions: one from
their initial scheme and one from the general scheme. The latter one
will be proportional to the number of years spent in this scheme, ac-
cording to equation (1), yet coeﬃcient   will be evaluated taking into
account the total number of years contributed, regardless of the
scheme. Reductions of  , furthermore, do not apply in a certain num-
ber of cases: veterans, disabled workers, and female workers with
twenty-four contributed years who have raised three children.
• Equation (1) also implies that pensions, at the time they are claimed,
are computed in current euros. They are then reevaluated each year on
a discretionary basis. During the 1970s and early 1980s, the general
policy was to overindex these pensions (with respect to the average
gross wage), in order to suppress the initial gap between standards of
living of workers and pensioners. Since the mid-1980s, the practice has
consisted rather in an indexation on prices. This practice has been con-
ﬁrmed by the 1993 reform.
• When the average annual wage (Dbest years) falls below a ﬂoor (about
€12,000 in 2000), it is raised to the level of that ﬂoor for individuals
who can claim a full-rate pension. These provisions (the minimum con-
tributif) mainly concern women who had part-time jobs or whose ca-
reers were short and whose annual earnings are thus very low. They in-
volve an additional strong incentive to postpone retirement until the
full-rate threshold.
• For women, Nmax and N  max are increased by two years for each child
they bred. Moreover, people (either men or women) who bred at least
three children enjoy a 10 percent increase in their basic pension.
4.2.3 Wage Earners from the Private Sector: Complementary Schemes
These schemes are almost fully contributory and are organized in a de-
ﬁned-contribution way (although they are not funded). Workers accumu-
late “points” during their careers, which are the pension’s basic unit of cal-
culation.
• The points are accumulated during workers’ careers in proportion to
their contributions: The contribution rate is ﬁxed, and €1 contributed
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points, where PP t is the purchase price of one point (the oﬃcial term
for this purchase price is salaire de référence).
• The pension is then equal to the total number of points accumulated
over the pensioner’s career, multiplied by a coeﬃcient V (the oﬃcial
term being valeur du point), which is ﬁxed every year.
For a pensioner who started working at time t0 and stopped at time t1,
the pension level at time t can therefore be written as
















where  (t ) and w(t ) are respectively the contribution rate and the worker’s
wage at time t . As explained before, only a fraction of the wage is taken into
account for computing contributions and points accumulated each year:
• For executives, contributions are collected by ARRCO for the part of
the wage below the ceiling, and by AGIRC for the segment of the wage
comprised between the SS ceiling and four times the ceiling; and
• For nonexecutives, the wage is truncated to three times the SS ceiling
and contributions are collected by ARRCO.
Concerning retirement age in these complementary schemes, normal re-
tirement theoretically remains at age sixty-ﬁve even after the 1983 reform,
which introduced retirement at age sixty in the general scheme. For retire-
ment below sixty-ﬁve, a quasi-actuarial adjustment is supposed to be ap-
plied. But since the 1983 reform, this adjustment is not applied to people
who fulﬁll the conditions for a basic retirement at full rate (more than 37.5
years of contribution).
4.2.4 Civil Servants
Civil servants have a unique pension scheme, directly ﬁnanced by the
state budget. As a general rule, claiming the pension is possible at age sixty
if people have at least ﬁfteen years of service. A rather large minority, how-
ever, can leave beginning at age ﬁfty-ﬁve: primary-school teachers, police-
men, prison oﬃcers, and the like. For women who have bred at least three
children, the age condition is completely relaxed (but the ﬁfteen-years-of-
service condition remains valid). The beneﬁt formula is
(3) Pension   0.75    
  (last gross wage, excluding bonuses).
The pension is a proportion of the last gross wage. Note that this gross
wage excludes bonuses, which represent up to 50 percent of the total net in-
N of quarters, truncated to Nmax     
Nmax
242 Ronan Mahieu and Didier Blanchetcome for some speciﬁc categories (i.e., the ones with the highest incomes):
These bonuses remain insigniﬁcant for most civil servants working for the
Education Department, which is the largest employer.
The key variable is the number of years a civil servant worked. Each year
entitles him to a 2 percent annuity (table 4.2), the sum being truncated to
75 percent. Once this basic annuity is computed, some other periods may
be taken into account: The most important provision is the additional year
given to women for each child they bred. Each additional year also yields
an additional 2 percent annuity that may increase the basic annuity up to
80 percent. Finally, people (either men or women) who bred at least three
children enjoy a substantial increase in their pension. This increase is 10
percent if they have bred three children and 5 percent for every additional
child. These provisions are roughly the same as in the private sector.
Note that this system strongly diﬀers from the general regime as regards
incentives to retire early: Let us consider the example of people reaching
the legal minimum age of retirement with only 32.5 years contributed and
who decide to claim immediately for their beneﬁts. The civil servant’s re-
placement rate is 65 percent (instead of 75 percent for a complete career).
The private sector wage earner’s replacement rate (basic pension only) is
21.7 percent (instead of 50 percent for a complete career).
4.2.5 Other Regulations Concerning Age at Retirement: Mandatory
Retirement and Eligibility to Early Retirement
Mandatory retirement as such only exists for civil servants or within spe-
ciﬁc schemes. The age for mandatory retirement is generally sixty-ﬁve, with
some exceptions either below that age (e.g., militaries, etc.) or above (very
limited categories are allowed to work until age sixty-eight, such as aca-
demics).
In the private sector, a ﬁrm is not allowed to layoﬀa worker according to
any age criterion. Yet it is allowed to do so when this worker reaches the
conditions to get a full-rate SS pension. Given the employment context of
the 1990s—and the relatively large wage gap between elder and younger
workers—it is quite likely that ﬁrms will quasi-systematically make use of
this possibility. A consequence, which shall be recalled later when inter-
preting results, is that decisions to retire at the age where people get the full
rate may be interpreted as demand-side as well as supply-side decisions.
Supply- and demand-side aspects are also strongly intertwined for all
forms of early retirement. Early retirement developed in France in several
steps. We shall only describe rules set in after the 1983 reform, that is, after
the generalization of possibilities to retire at age sixty. There are two main
paths to early exit from the labor force:
• One is through unemployment insurance. People falling into unem-
ployment are entitled to a compensation for a limited period of time,
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creasing with the duration of unemployment. But these rules do not
apply to people losing their jobs past a certain age (ﬁfty-seven until
mid-1993, when it was raised to ﬁfty-eight) who can beneﬁt from a full
compensation until they are able to beneﬁt from a normal SS pension
at a full rate. This system is not oﬃcially described as an early retire-
ment system, and people cannot enter into it completely freely: They
can do so only if they have been explicitly laid oﬀ by their employers.
Yet this system is more or less equivalent to an early retirement
scheme;
• The second path for early exit is the Fonds National pour l’Emploi
(FNE; National Fund for Employment). The level of early retirement
beneﬁts is roughly similar to the level of unemployment beneﬁts.
People beneﬁting from this system can leave the labor force around
ﬁfty-eight with beneﬁts maintained until access to a full-rate pension
in the general regime. The diﬀerence with the former path is that this
system is under direct control by the state: Access to the FNE only
concerns workers laid oﬀ in the context of a social plan negotiated be-
tween the ﬁrm and the state, with some compensations oﬀered by the
ﬁrm (for instance, a commitment to hire new young workers).
4.3 Data Description and Scope of the Present Study
4.3.1 Empirical Observations and Research
on Labor Force Trends at Older Ages
How do these institutional rules aﬀect aggregate labor force participa-
tion at older ages? In 1998 (table 4.3), employment rates reached 75 percent
for people aged ﬁfty to ﬁfty-four, but sharply decreased thereafter to 53
percent for the ﬁfty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-nine age group and only 12.4 percent (most
of them being self-employed) for the sixty to sixty-four age group. Partici-
pation rates are close to zero after sixty-ﬁve. Very few self-employed retire
before sixty, but exit rates are high from ﬁfty-ﬁve for wage earners.
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Table 4.3 Labor Market Participation, by Age Group
Employed
Age Cohort Public Sector Private Sector Self-Employed Not Working
50–54 1944–48 22.6 33.4 18.8 25.2
55–59 1939–43 13.3 21.9 18.0 46.8
60–64 1934–38 2.5 3.5 6.4 87.6
65–69 1929–33 0.0 0.3 1.2 98.5
Source: INSEE, 1998 Financial Assets Survey.As mentioned in the introduction, for men, this is the result of a large de-
crease in labor force participation after age ﬁfty over the past twenty years.
The share of men employed at ages ﬁfty-ﬁve, sixty, and sixty-ﬁve decreased
from 83.4 percent, 47.0 percent, and 14.7 percent, respectively, in 1983 to
78.5 percent, 32.1 percent, and 4.9 percent in 1998. Nonetheless, the regu-
lar decrease in male employment rates appears to have slowed down since
1997, due to the economic recovery. For women, current ﬁgures are the re-
sult of the combination between this tendency to earlier exits from the la-
bor force and the impact of the long-run increase in overall labor force par-
ticipation between successive cohorts. The decline at ages ﬁfty-ﬁve to
ﬁfty-nine and sixty to sixty-four has been lower than for men: from re-
spectively 29.1 percent and 9.4 percent in 1983 to 25.9 percent and 5.9 per-
cent in 1998. And the trend remained positive in the age group ﬁfty to ﬁfty-
four: from 52.2 percent to 57.9 percent over the same period.
About 8 percent of the population received public beneﬁts (mainly un-
employment beneﬁts) between ﬁfty and ﬁfty-four in 1998 (table 4.4). This
ﬁgures reaches 23.7 percent between ﬁfty-ﬁve and ﬁfty-nine, due to unem-
ployment, early retirement (in the private sector), or SS beneﬁts (for a
strong minority of civil servants). Between sixty and sixty-four, 72.7 per-
cent of the population receives public beneﬁts (mainly SS beneﬁts).
Previous research on retirement behavior in France is relatively scarce,
partly because economists lacked suitable data until appropriate adminis-
trative ﬁles were built. Moreover, individuals were so heavily constrained
by SS incentives that explaining actual behaviors did not require a sophis-
ticated approach (in econometric terms, for instance). In the ﬁrst part of
this project, Blanchet and Pelé (1999) showed that incentives to retire at the
full rate were very strong, and Pelé and Ralle (1997), using a lifecycle model
(based on an intertemporal budget constraint), demonstrated that retiring
at the full rate was consistent with a rational utility-maximizing behavior.
Of course, retirement cannot entirely be explained by SS incentives: An-
alyzing early retirement behaviors in France as a three-player game (the
ﬁrm, the employee, and the government) may be of great interest, but once
again, the lack of appropriate ﬁrm data did not allow for a comprehensive
analysis of individual behaviors concerning early retirement.
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Table 4.4 Part of the Population Receiving Public Beneﬁts, by Age Group
Age Cohort SS Beneﬁts ER Beneﬁts UI Beneﬁts Total
50–54 1944–48 1.3 0.0 7.2 8.5
55–59 1939–43 9.4 6.0 8.3 23.7
60–64 1934–38 68.9 1.4 2.4 72.7
65–69 1929–33 86.2 0.0 0.0 86.2
Source: INSEE, 1998 Financial Assets Survey.
Notes: ER = early retirement; UI = unemployment insurance.4.3.2 The Data Set: The Echantillon Interrégime de Retraités
Few systematic data sets exist in France concerning the economic situa-
tion of retired people. Income surveys only give instantaneous and imper-
fect pictures of transfer-income beneﬁts to retirees: They do not allow the
reconstitution of past labor income that would allow the evaluation of
what these transfers would have been if pensioners had made other choices
concerning their age at retirement.
Some other speciﬁc surveys were also realized to analyze the transition
between activity and retirement (e.g., a questionnaire on this topic was
added to the periodic Labor Force Survey in 1996). These surveys are espe-
cially useful for analyzing the variety of institutional paths from full-time
activity to retirement (Heller 1985; Caussat and Roth 1997; and Burricand
and Roth 2000) and provide some interesting information on standards of
living before retirement. However, these surveys do not provide precise in-
formation on past wages and thus do not allow the computation of ﬁnan-
cial incentives to retirement. This is the reason why another approach has
been developed since 1984 that consists of matching administrative data
collected from all pension schemes that exist in France.
In practice, the only large-scale survey that is available and appropriate
for the current study is a speciﬁc panel, the Échantillon Interrégime De Re-
traités (hereafter referred as EIR). The panel has been initially developed
by the Service des Statistiques et des Systèmes d’Information (SESI),1 the
statistical unit within the Ministry of Social Aﬀairs, in connection with the
INSEE. For the ﬁrst run in 1988, four cohorts of pensioners were selected:
those born in 1906, 1912, 1918, and 1922. A total sample of 20,000 people
belonging to these four cohorts was drawn by INSEE. Their national iden-
tiﬁcation numbers were transmitted by INSEE to all existing pension
schemes (more than 120 basic schemes and about 180 complementary
schemes). All these pension schemes then had to search for these individ-
uals in their records. If they were present, the information about their pen-
sion entitlements was then transmitted to the SESI, who then carried out
the matching, for all individuals of the sample, of the information returned
by all existing pension schemes.
The operation was renewed in 1993 and 1997. Each time, the same
samples were redrawn for the cohorts included in the previous studies (and
enlarged to compensate for mortality), and new cohorts added to the
panel: cohort 1926 in 1993, cohorts 1930, 1932, 1934, 1936, 1938, 1940, and
1942 in 1997 (table 4.5). Since 1990, an additional matching has also been
introduced with information from other administrative sources:
• The annual declarations of social data (DADS), made each year by
ﬁrms, that allow retrieval of the wages of the sample participants over
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1. See Dangerﬁeld and Prangère (1996). Since 1998, the SESI has been integrated into a
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Table 4.5 The Structure of the Interregime Panel of Pensioners
Pensions (if any) Observed In:
Wages and/or UI/ER





1926 ✕✕ Age 59 → retirement
1930 ✕ Age 55 → retirement
1932 ✕ Age 53 → retirement
1934 ✕ Age 51 → retirement
1936 ✕ Age 49 → retirement
1938 ✕ Age 47 → retirement
1940 ✕ Age 45 → retirement
1942 ✕ Age 43 → retirement
aOne year missing (1990).
the years before retirement if these people were wage earners in the
private sector or in state-owned companies;
• The wage ﬁles from the State Service for former civil servants; and
• Files from the Union Nationale pour l’Emploi dans l’Industrie et le
Commerce (UNEDIC), the French system of unemployment insur-
ance, for people in unemployment before retirement, allowing there-
fore the incorporation of the form of early retirement beneﬁts oﬀered
by the UNEDIC and the FNE (see previous discussion).
This matching, however, does not allow a full reconstitution of past ca-
reers for these pensioners. The DADS, in particular, generally do not go
back further than 1985, with one additional missing year in 1990. This
matching, for this reason, has not been done for cohorts 1906, 1912, and
1918, for whom it would have been irrelevant.
Table 4.5 sums up the structure of data available in the panel. Our ques-
tion has been to explore how these data could be best used for the estima-
tion of model of retirement behavior for France. The choices which have
been made resulted from two constraints:
• The need, conversely, to have people for whom the situation before re-
tirement has been observed over a signiﬁcant period, in order to be
able to extrapolate what their standard of living would have been in
case they would have retired later than they actually did; and
• The need to limit ourselves to cohorts for whom entry into retirement
can be considered as fully completed. As detailed in the next subsec-
tion, our method for reconstructing individual pension entitlements
under alternative retirement ages essentially relies on the pension level
obtained at the actualretirement age. Of course, one possibility would
have been, for people not yet retired, to evaluate entitlements on thebasis of past working records. But the length of our wage records was
too short for such a reconstitution, and, for this population, our ﬁles
did not provide any proxy at all for the key variable, which is the num-
ber of quarters of past contributions to SS.
The ﬁrst constraint clearly ruled out cohorts 1906 to 1922. We also con-
sidered that wage data were too short on average for cohort 1926 (only two
years of wages being observed for an individual of this cohort retiring in
1986). The second constraint, on the opposite, ruled out cohorts 1934 to
1942. Even if a signiﬁcant share of these cohorts was retired in 1997, we
would have missed the fraction retiring at sixty-ﬁve, which is precisely the
fraction that brings the variance necessary to identify models. We consid-
ered that the same problem existed for workers from the private sector in
cohort 1932. So that, for this category, we ﬁnally restricted ourselves to co-
hort 1930. For civil servants, however, we decided to use both cohorts 1930
and 1932, in order to increase somewhat the sample size, considering that
the selection bias on cohort 1932 was lower than for the private sector and
given an average age at retirement, which is lower in the public than in the
private sector.
Concerning the key question of the deﬁnition of retirement, our data al-
lowed two possible choices: either the age when people deﬁnitely leave the
labor market or the age when people claim SS beneﬁts. But this latter deﬁ-
nition is not the most interesting from an economic point of view, since a
huge majority of people in the private sector claim SS beneﬁts as soon as
they reach the full-rate age. It is more interesting to analyze the impact of
SS provisions (and, if possible, preretirement or unemployment provi-
sions) on the decision to deﬁnitely leave the labor market. We therefore de-
cided to model the last year of recorded past employment using DADS
data. This, of course, implies a restriction to people who are in paid em-
ployment in 1985, which limits our sample a bit further.
4.3.3 Reconstructing Wages and Pension Levels
What are the prerequisites concerning wage data in order to evaluate in-
centives to retire at diﬀerent ages? A priori, wage data are needed for two
things:
• Full wage histories are necessary to know how pension entitlements
change with age at retirement, and
• A projection of wages is also necessary to evaluate earnings foregone
in case of exit from the labor force.
As stated before, our data do not go back earlier than the mid-eighties,
so wage histories in our sample are strongly truncated. As mentioned, a re-
constitution of wages for earlier time periods could have been attempted,
but the speciﬁc rules concerning the computation of pensions imply that
248 Ronan Mahieu and Didier Blanchetsuch a retropolation did not appear to be necessary once we restricted our-
selves to cohorts for whom at least one observation concerning the level of
pensions was available.
The strategy is the following: We know, for these people, their exact age
at retirement r and the basic and complementary pensions obtained at this
age P b(r) and P c(r). We have to compute what pension entitlements would
have been in case of claiming pension at ages r  greater or lower than r.
Concerning the basic pension, if we go back to equation (1) and if we con-
sider that delaying or anticipating retirement would only have a marginal
impact on the average wage of the ten best years,2 the impact of a change
in r is only to change N, the total number of quarters of contribution (if not
truncated to 150), and to change the coeﬃcient  , which for 60   r   65 or
N 150 quarters, is reduced by 5 percent for each year of anticipation. The
result of these changes on P b(r) is quite easy to compute. Information on
wages is here superﬂuous.
Concerning complementary schemes, information on wages becomes
necessary, but we do not need more than information on wages at later
ages. Let us consider the case of an individual whose complementary pen-
sion only depends on ARRCO. From equation (2), we get that the varia-
tion of the expected pension level at t, if working until age r   1 instead of
r would have been  V(t)   V(t) (g   r   1)w(g   r  1)/PP(g   r   1) for
an individual born in g, plus the eventual application of the reduction co-
eﬃcient for those people not fulﬁlling the condition for the maximum
value of the annuity rate   in the general scheme. This computation, too,
does not require any retrospective information concerning wages. For civil
servants, the only necessary information is the last wage: There is no need
of past wages.
The only requirement concerning wages, therefore, is the extrapolation
of notional wages for periods later than people’s actual retirement ages.
This extrapolation was made for workers from the private sector using wage
equations more fully described in the appendix. For civil servants, we lim-
ited ourselves to extrapolations of observed wages, indexed only on prices.
4.3.4 Other Data
Computing the actual value of future pension beneﬁts required some ad-
ditional information regarding people’s own mortality risk, as well as the
presence of a spouse and this spouse’s mortality risk, assuming that indi-
vidual evaluations of beneﬁts include the evaluation of survival beneﬁts if
the individual dies before their spouse.
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2. This assumption is especially plausible given the truncation of wages. For people above
the ceiling, the average wage of the ten best years will be generally equal to this ceiling, and
one more year of work will generally not change this. This does not hold for people below the
ceiling, but these people’s careers are generally ﬂatter, so that the same approximation may re-
main valid.Mortality rates for people in the sample used are diﬀerentiated by sex,
age, and socioprofessional group. One point must be noted here: Since the
sample is conditioned on surviving until the age of sixty-four or sixty-six
(depending on the cohort), a selection bias may result if there is a correla-
tion between mortality and the retirement decision. If people with bad
health status and a higher mortality risk tend to more frequently anticipate
the claiming of their beneﬁts, there will be a tendency to overestimate the
actual age at retirement.
Concerning information on spouses, unfortunately, the EIR did not pro-
duce any reliable information, even limited to the indication of the pres-
ence of a spouse. The reason is that information on marital status, in these
ﬁles, is only updated when it becomes necessary, that is, generally at the
pensioner’s death (if survival beneﬁts are to be paid). We restricted our-
selves to a model of retirement choice where only personal entitlements are
taken into account, rather than attempting a reconstitution of variables re-
lating to spouse’s presence, age, and status.
The ﬁnal sample consists in 9,884 observations (table 4.6) corresponding
to 2,202 individuals still employed at ﬁfty-ﬁve (who are thus observed on
average between four and ﬁve years before they retire), 75% of which are
employed in the private sector (with a majority of men). Note that the av-
erage tenure at ﬁfty-ﬁve is pretty high (over thirty-six years) and close to
the tenure required to reach the full rate at sixty: This reﬂects the fact that
most people from the sample are entitled to full SS beneﬁts as soon as sixty
(especially men, see ﬁgure 4.1).
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Table 4.6 Descriptive Statistics on the Sample
Variable Mean Value
















Total tenure (years) 36.4
Note: Sample size = 9,884 observations corresponding to 2.202 individual paths.Analyzing pathways to retirement is straightforward for civil servants
(they have no other choice than waiting until the minimum age to claim SS
beneﬁts, unless they chose to consume their savings). In the private sector
(table 4.7), about 60 percent of people still working at ﬁfty-ﬁve do not re-
ceive public beneﬁts other than SS beneﬁts. The remaining 40 percent are
roughly equally divided between people retiring through unemployment
and early retirement schemes.
Table 4.8 provides information on the level of the parameter  . A very
tiny minority of men (0.3 percent) claim SS beneﬁts at reduced rate,
whereas the ﬁgure grows to 4.4 percent for women. About 4 percent of men
and women are considered as disabled are thus allowed to claim full-rate
SS beneﬁts at sixty (even if their tenure is below 150 quarters). Also, 3.7
percent of men and 10.7 percent of women are “unﬁt” to do a job and thus
beneﬁt a full-rate pension at sixty. Others (over 80 percent of the sample)
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Fig. 4.1 Distribution of tenure at age 55
Table 4.7 Pathways to Retirement in the Sample
Retiree Category
Private Sector Civil Servants
Pathway Men Women Total Total
Directly to SS 57.4 60.8 58.7 100.0
ER then SS 20.7 18.4 19.8 0.0
UI then SS 21.9 20.8 21.5 0.0
Source:Authors’ calculations from EIR, cohort 1930; people still working at 55 (data source).reach the full rate in normal conditions. In the public sector, there is no
such incentive to postpone claiming SS beneﬁts after the minimum age
(mostly sixty) since   is set to 75 percent whatever the total tenure.
Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to note that the retirement rate for the civil
servants that reach age sixty with 150 quarters or more is 69 percent,
whereas it drops to 53 percent for those who reach age sixty with less than
150 quarters. Moreover, the mean wage of civil servants who keep on work-
ing after sixty is €32,000 (instead of €23,400 for those who quit at sixty).
Remember that highly paid civil servants have, on average, lower replace-
ment rates since a large part of their wage consists of bonuses. At ﬁrst
glance, civil servants also seem sensitive to SS incentives (despite their
weakness), but these preliminary observations must be conﬁrmed by a
deeper analysis.
4.4 A Descriptive Analysis of Incentives to Retire
4.4.1 Deﬁnition of Incentive Variables
Two kinds of models will be applied to the analysis of labor force partic-
ipation rates of older workers. In a ﬁrst step, we shall introduce simple mea-
sures of SS incentives to retire in probit models to describe the choice to
retire at age t for individuals still in the labor force at this age. For an
individual aged t, we ﬁrst compute SS wealth at age t. The value of this so-
cial security wealth (SSW) will depend on the age t  greater than or equal
to t at which this individual will decide to retire. Also, Bs(t ) is the expected
level of pension at age s for an individual who retired at age t ; if  (s/t) is
the probability of surviving up to age s for an individual ages t, and if T, at
last, is the maximal age at death, we write:
SSW t,t   ∑
T
s t 
 s t   
s
t
  Bs(t )
From this value, we derive the pension accrual at age t that is the alge-
braic increase in SSW, which results, at age t, from the postponement of re-
tirement by one year, that is,
252 Ronan Mahieu and Didier Blanchet




Normal conditions 92.0 81.0
“Unﬁt” for a job 3.7 10.7
Disabled 4.0 3.9
Reduced rate 0.3 4.4Accrualt   SSW t,t 1   SSW t,t.
The accrual will be our ﬁrst measure of SS incentives. The tax rate is di-
rectly derived from the accrual: It captures the fact that a negative accrual
involves an implicit tax on continued work, because a part of the expected
wage (if the agent postpones retirement) is taxed through the decrease in
the SSW. The tax rate thus writes










An alternative measure is also directly derived from the deﬁnition of
SSW. This variable is the peak index, which is the diﬀerence between the
maximum of the SSWs associated to all possible ages at retirement beyond
the current year, and SSW in case of an immediate retirement.
Peakt   max
s t 1
[SSW t,s]   SSW t,t
It assumes a less myopic behavior by the individual, who considers not
only the potential gain in SSW resulting from delaying retirement by one
year, but also gains that may be derived from retiring in any subsequent
year. However, as with all measures derived from SSW, a limitation of this
index is that it does not take into account the comparison that the indi-
vidual can make between pension beneﬁts and the level of his labor in-
come. It assumes that the retirement decision is only aﬀected by varia-
tions of pension entitlements. This limitation will be corrected in the
following estimation by the introduction of wages as covariates in probit
models, but it is more satisfactory to introduce incentive measures which
introduce this comparison between beneﬁt and wage levels in a less ad hoc
way.
This is the case if we start from a model which fully includes expected
ﬂows of utility derived either from labor or retirement income. The model
used is the Stock and Wise (1990) option value model. Let us again con-
sider an individual still in the labor force at age t. If they expects to retire at
age r, they can expect a ﬂow of labor incomes of (Y t, ...   Yr–1) until retire-
ment and then a ﬂow of pension beneﬁts (Br(r), Br 1(r), . . . , Bs(r), . . .). It
is assumed that this individual derives an indirect utility Uw from his labor
income and an indirect utility Ur from pension beneﬁts. Time discounting
occurs at rate  . For an age at retirement equal to r, the expected utility at
age t is therefore
V t(r)  ∑
r 1
s t





Uw(Y s)   Y s
 ,
Uw(Bs)   [kBs] .
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ing income ﬂows through private savings, an assumption that will be es-
sentially valid for low- or medium-income workers. Given this deﬁnition of
utility, we assume that the individual decides to retire if the resulting ex-
pected utility is higher than the maximum value of utilities expected for all
other possible choices r   t. If we write
Gr(r)   V t(r)   V t(t),
the individual chooses to remain in the labor force if Gt(r∗) greater than 0
where
r∗   Arg max
r t 1
V t(r).
The equation Gt(r∗) greater than 0 is called the option value of postponing
retirement in order to express that, given the irreversibility of retirement,
remaining in the labor force oﬀers the option to leave the labor force at a
later age under better conditions. Stock and Wise (1990) performed a full
maximum likelihood estimation of the model on U.S. data that yielded  
equals 0.97,   equals 1.25, and   equals 0.6. Our own estimation of the
model on French data led us to adopt the following parameterization:  
equals 0.97,   equals 1.6, and   0.25. These values imply some risk aversion
and a moderate preference for leisure: In the context of a one period
model, a value of   equal to 1.6 means that an individual would demand a
leisure income equal to 62.5 percent of his labor income to accept not to
work.
4.4.2 Including Incentives Linked to Unemployment
Beneﬁts and Early Retirement
We next present evaluations of incentives that (imperfectly) take into ac-
count the additional incentives imbedded in unemployment insurance
(UI) and early retirement schemes. Assume, as a ﬁrst step, that an individ-
ual is actually free to choose one of these means of early exit from the la-
bor force. We can therefore compute three values for the SSW: the one
computed above on the basis of normal pension entitlements only and the
values if we assume that the individual begins by spending a few years in
unemployment or in the early retirement scheme and then moves on to
normal retirement once he is entitled to the full-rate SS. For instance, for
an individual aged ﬁfty-ﬁve, we compute the following values, depending
on age t at which they will leave the labor force:
SSW155,t   Σs
T
 60 s–t (s/t)Bs
Pension (t) is the individual only relies on his
normal pension;
SSW255,t   Σ59
s t s–t (s/t)Bs
UI(t)   Σs
T
 60 s–t (s/t)Bs
Pension (t) for a transition
through UI;
254 Ronan Mahieu and Didier BlanchetSSW355,t   Σ59
s t s–t (s/t)Bs
ER(t)   Σs
T
 60 s–t (s/t)Bs




pre are computed as a fraction of the last wage by direct
application of oﬃcial rules.
We then compute a weighted average of these three SSWs. Weights are
a function of the sector of activity and reﬂect take-up probabilities. We
tested other covariates, like sex and professional status (executives versus
blue-collars versus white collars), but their coeﬃcients are mostly insignif-
icant if sector dummies are included. This strategy is consistent with the re-
sults of previous studies that show that the sector of activity predicts access
to early retirement or unemployment schemes far better than qualiﬁcation
or social group (Colin Iéhlé, and Mahieu 2000). As a general rule, the prob-
ability of facing a period of unemployment or early retirement at the end
of one’s career is markedly higher (at least for cohorts born around 1930)
in industries. In particular, it is the automobile industry that concentrates
the highest risks: At ﬁfty-ﬁve, there was a 60 percent probability of enter-
ing into unemployment or early retirement for a wage earner in the auto-
mobile industry. The reason is that, around 1985, some sectors—including
the automobile industry—beneﬁted from exceptions allowing a lower age
at  entry in the Allocation Spéciale du Fonds National pour l’Emploi
(ASFNE; ﬁfty-ﬁve years instead of ﬁfty-six years and two months). We ﬁ-




Individuals are followed between ages ﬁfty-ﬁve and sixty-ﬁve. We ask
what has been the structure of incentives to retire in this sample and how
have these incentives determined actual retirement decisions? Given the
discrepancy between SS incentives in the private sector and for civil ser-
vants, it seems appropriate to give separate results for each sector.
In the private sector, the median SSW for males regularly increases with
age after ﬁfty-ﬁve to reach €200,000 at sixty (table 4.9). This is due partly
to the increase in pension entitlements while tenure grows, but also to a se-
lection bias: People who quit before the early retirement age of sixty (who
mostly receive unemployment or early retirement beneﬁts) get, on average,
lower wages than those who stay on the labor market. Since pension enti-
tlements are strongly correlated with labor income, this partly explains the
age proﬁle of median SSW. The median accrual is positive (though dimin-
ishing) until ﬁfty-nine, with a relatively large dispersion: Those who al-
ready have a tenure above 37.5 years have very low accruals (see the tenth
Estimating Models of Retirement Behavior on French Data 255percentile), while those whose tenure is below 37.5 years have very high ac-
cruals (see the ninetieth percentile). Median tax rates between ﬁfty-ﬁve and
ﬁfty-seven exhibit quite large subsidies to work (from 20 percent to 50 per-
cent) that nonetheless remain low compared to the base case computed by
Blanchet and Pelé (1999; last column)—about 90 percent at ages ﬁfty-ﬁve
to ﬁfty-six. This discrepancy results from the characteristics of their base
case: a man who works continuously from age twenty. As a result, the base
case exhibits very large subsidies until he reaches the full rate (at ﬁfty-
eight). After that age, the very low increase in pension entitlements (essen-
tially through complementary schemes) cannot even compensate the loss
of payroll taxes, which explains the slight tax on continued work at ﬁfty-
eight to ﬁfty-nine (4–5 percent) in this previous study.
After age sixty, the median SSW suddenly increases by about 25 percent,
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Age N Median Median Percentile Percentile SD Median Previous
55 1,077 152,476 8,438 2,751 22,324 19,714 –0.54 –0.91
56 862 161,350 4,945 1,631 19,877 18,634 –0.31 –0.97
57 712 170,499 3,621 1,047 18,243 8,031 –0.21 –0.46
58 622 180,368 1,745 –529 12,812 7,227 –0.09 0.04
59 539 189,460 2,937 647 14,955 8,419 –0.15 0.05
60 501 199,327 –11,734 –19,845 –4,198 9,122 0.73 0.67
61 85 247,305 –11,335 –27,410 4,141 15,528 0.35 0.60
62 84 244,555 –11,634 –29,285 2,996 14,760 0.45 0.63
63 60 220,831 –11,956 –30,532 2,464 13,525 0.46 0.56
64 48 196,433 –10,654 –31,313 2,998 12,391 0.50 0.56
65 38 163,729 –10,810 –40,138 –4,610 11,194 0.75 0.52
Peak Value Option Value
10th 90th 10th 90th
Median Percentile Percentile SD Median Percentile Percentile SD
55 1,077 12,792 4,120 53,414 45,792 46.46 38.94 64.70 15.66
56 862 6,962 1,680 43,187 48,979 36.52 30.00 54.61 14.33
57 712 4,819 1,057 36,087 18,072 28.73 24.27 44.25 9.98
58 622 3,339 –529 24,602 16,306 20.16 16.91 32.63 9.12
59 539 2,958 647 16,144 18,491 11.56 9.84 20.76 9.96
60 501 –11,734 –19,845 –4,198 18,010 –0.57 –1.86 5.56 8.87
61 85 –11,335 –27,410 4,937 30,251 1.50 –2.02 20.18 12.32
62 84 –11,634 –29,285 4,143 24,864 0.51 –2.05 14.67 9.83
63 60 –11,956 –30,532 2,858 15,841 0.20 –2.21 11.78 7.24
64 48 –10,654 –31,313 2,998 13,056 0.00 –2.46 8.00 4.71
65 38 –10,810 –40,138 –4,610 11,194 –0.68 –3.81 1.91 2.50
Note: N = number of observations; SD = standard deviation.which reﬂects the fact that people who keep on working after the early re-
tirement age are often better educated and thus better paid than the aver-
age. Of course, the median SSW declines from age sixty-one since median
pension entitlements grow very slowly (most of these people could claim a
full-rate SS beneﬁt) while these people give up one year of beneﬁts. The me-
dian accrual thus remains strongly negative (about –11,000) while a mi-
nority of men have positive accruals (see the ninetieth percentile) because
they have a total tenure below 37.5 years. The median tax rate is lower at
ages sixty-one to sixty-four (below 50 percent than at sixty (73 percent) due
to this selection bias: People still on the labor market after sixty are either
better paid than the average (and the denominator of the tax rate is higher)
or they cannot get a full-rate SS pension (and their tax rate is negative). But
tax rates reach 75 percent at age sixty-ﬁve (and accruals are systematically
negative) since everybody may claim a full-rate SS pension from that age.
If we turn to peak value (PV) measures (table 4.9), the results are very
close to those obtained with accrual measures: After age sixty, accrual and
PV are negative (increases in pension entitlements cannot compensate the
loss of one year or more of beneﬁts since most men already have the full
rate), and thus accrual and PV are mostly the same. Concerning option
value (OV) measures, we now have further explanations for the behavior of
men who keep on working after age sixty, although they are entitled to a
full-rate SS pension. We mentioned that these people were quite well paid,
which was suggested by tax rate measures but not by accrual measures (the
median value of accrual was strongly negative). Here, the median OV value
is positive at ages sixty-one to sixty-four, whereas it was negative at sixty.
The OV measures include data on expected wages. Given the structural
form of the utility used to build OV measures, the OV is decreasing with the
replacement rate. Since the replacement rate is lower for highly paid em-
ployees, they face an incentive to postpone retirement, and their OV is thus
positive. The distribution of OV is thus consistent with behaviors observed
in the data.
Women in the private sector basically face similar incentives (table 4.10).
The only serious diﬀerence is that a larger proportion of them cannot claim
a full-rate SS pension at sixty since female careers are shorter than male ca-
reers (although this fact is somewhat weakened by our sample selection:
Women who were still working at ﬁfty-ﬁve had a larger tenure than the av-
erage). As a result, after age sixty, the median accrual is positive and the
median tax rate exhibits a strong subsidy on continued work (about 30–40
percent). Note that the ninetieth percentile for accrual is particularly high
at sixty-four: This results from the minimum pension provisions for low-
wage earners (minimum contributif ) that are available at sixty-ﬁve for
people with short careers. The PV, in general, is larger than the accrual for
these women with short careers: This accounts for the fact that they face a
strong incentive to postpone retirement by several years.
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Age N Median Median Percentile Percentile SD Median Previous
55 679 98,405 5,042 2,469 16,636 6,055 –0.44 –0.91
56 563 108,031 3,818 1,955 15,536 6,001 –0.41 –0.97
57 474 114,757 3,271 1,305 14,891 5,379 –0.32 –0.46
58 404 121,668 1,987 –147 11,636 5,012 –0.21 0.04
59 343 130,117 2,873 771 11,604 5,098 –0.26 0.05
60 325 139,462 –4,734 –12,774 7,965 8,094 0.45 0.67
61 94 108,838 3,686 –10,766 10,444 8,048 –0.44 0.60
62 94 118,268 3,967 –11,117 9,157 7,818 –0.36 0.63
63 80 112,247 2,901 –10,315 7,265 7,813 –0.31 0.56
64 65 112,234 5,273 –9,625 29,056 15,150 –0.47 0.56
65 52 119,365 –5,188 –12,036 –1,895 5,398 0.41 0.52
Peak Value Option Value
10th 90th 10th 90th
Median Percentile Percentile SD Median Percentile Percentile SD
55 679 20,501 4,579 53,505 20,424 55.18 40.55 76.58 15.22
56 563 14,649 2,539 47,250 18,120 45.12 31.06 65.88 14.00
57 474 10,400 1,379 42,504 17,195 34.91 24.74 57.52 14.01
58 404 6,891 –127 38,170 16,303 25.14 17.60 48.43 13.66
59 343 4,139 771 37,370 15,620 14.67 9.93 39.47 13.60
60 325 –4,734 –12,774 35,149 18,851 1.60 –1.20 28.71 13.97
61 94 13,830 –10,766 33,704 18,392 12.55 0.52 32.39 13.72
62 94 13,228 –11,117 30,485 16,384 10.20 0.26 29.55 12.09
63 80 8,471 –10,315 28,572 15,579 7.19 –0.39 30.24 11.49
64 65 5,273 –9,625 29,056 15,151 4.03 –0.72 25.92 9.85
65 52 –5,188 –12,036 –1,895 5,398 0.51 –0.60 1.92 1.13
Note: N = number of observations; SD = standard deviation.
Civil Servants
If we turn to male civil servants (table 4.11), the median SSW is much
higher than in the private sector since it reaches €375,000 at sixty (instead
of €200,000). This discrepancy is ﬁrst due to higher wages on average (civil
servants are often better educated, and a large proportion of them are
teachers). But the higher life expectancy at sixty for civil servants also plays
a role in this gap. The male civil-servants sample may be divided between
those are entitled to a pension from ﬁfty-ﬁve and those who are entitled
from sixty. In the ﬁrst subsample, the accrual is always negative from age
ﬁfty-ﬁve: the increase in the pension for each additional year is too weak
to compensate the loss of one year of pension. The tenth percentile of ac-
crual is thus negative from ﬁfty-ﬁve. But, since a majority of civil servants
cannot claim SS beneﬁts before sixty, the median accrual remains positiveuntil ﬁfty-nine. Conversely, from sixty, the accrual is negative for all. Me-
dian tax rates exhibit a slight subsidy to continued work until ﬁfty-nine
(10–20 percent) and then become clearly positive (above 50 percent).
Nonetheless, the very low decrease in the median tax rate after age sixty
reﬂects the fact that those who postpone retirement after sixty often have
higher wages and lower replacement rates (since a larger proportion of
their labor income consists in bonuses that give no additional rights for
pensions). This is conﬁrmed by the slight increase in the OV measure be-
tween ages sixty and sixty-one (table 4.11), But this result is less robust
than in the private sector. The OV measure becomes extremely negative at
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Table 4.11 Retirement Incentives for Male Civil Servants (€)
Accrual
SSW 10th 90th Tax Rate
Age N Median Median Percentile Percentile SD Median
53 88 266,692 5,694 3,659 7,444 1,776 –0.27
54 89 280,429 2,845 1,774 4,215 1,468 –0.13
55 174 296,910 4,506 –14,276 7,622 9,241 –0.21
56 157 307,998 2,728 –17,613 4,719 8,990 –0.12
57 132 332,907 4,793 –2,957 7,504 5,975 –0.19
58 128 350,753 3,142 –5,134 5,307 5,903 –0.13
59 126 360,674 3,510 –3,050 9,161 5,863 –0.14
60 123 375,387 –19,292 –29,377 –12,145 7,697 0.66
61 46 409,197 –22,290 –31,295 –11,669 8,346 0.59
62 34 409,402 –21,885 –32,314 –9,008 8,892 0.50
63 22 416,091 –28,092 –36,585 –11,335 10,489 0.67
64 18 400,195 –25,848 –38,011 –10,560 9,755 0.56
65 13 462,172 –33,517 –44,240 –13,348 12,272 0.61
Peak Value Option Value
10th 90th 10th 90th
Median Percentile Percentile SD Median Percentile Percentile SD
53 88 14,754 6,966 40,109 13,121 76.37 23.62 87.67 28.24
54 89 10,487 2,346 33,463 12,525 65.81 11.90 76.52 28.87
55 174 10,817 –14,276 29,933 17,298 56.33 –0.60 64.56 28.22
56 157 9,344 –17,613 24,291 15,547 46.84 –0.96 53.52 20.99
57 132 10,143 –2,957 20,620 10,504 36.56 31.19 41.15 9.59
58 128 6,280 –4,847 14,002 8,820 24.80 21.59 28.39 6.04
59 126 3,510 –3,050 9,161 5,863 12.86 11.13 15.70 3.15
60 123 –19,292 –29,377 –12,145 7,697 –0.21 –1.66 2.23 1.93
61 46 –22,290 –31,295 –11,669 8,346 0.02 –1.26 3.10 2.23
62 34 –21,885 –32,314 –9,008 8,892 0.10 –1.04 1.65 2.43
63 22 –28,092 –36,585 –11,335 10,489 –0.90 –2.24 0.79 2.31
64 18 –25,848 –38,011 –10,560 9,755 –0.39 –1.32 0.56 1.27
65 13 –33,517 –44,240 –13,348 12,272 –14.76 –15.82 –11.70 2.01
Note: N = number of observations; SD = standard deviation.sixty-ﬁve because of mandatory retirement: If people postpone claiming
their pension, they do not enjoy any labor income ﬂows. The results are
similar for female civil servants (table 4.12).
4.5 Econometric Analysis
We now analyze the decision to retire with probit models including in-
centive variables among regressors. Control variables are age, tenure, so-
cioprofessional group, sector dummies, expected earnings and its square,
and linear age or age dummies. Estimations are performed separately for
260 Ronan Mahieu and Didier Blanchet
Table 4.12 Retirement Incentives for Female Civil Servants (€)
Accrual
SSW 10th 90th Tax Rate
Age N Median Median Percentile Percentile SD Median
53 122 280,498 5,946 –7,517 7,415 5,896 –0.33
54 123 294,718 2,816 –10,512 4,323 6,450 –0.16
55 223 301,786 2,891 –16,901 6,879 9,632 –0.16
56 188 300,239 1,937 –19,122 4,448 10,122 –0.13
57 161 278,203 3,704 –14,030 6,537 8,692 –0.23
58 149 277,062 2,623 –16,519 5,003 8,637 –0.16
59 140 278,215 4,049 –13,116 9,377 8,159 –0.24
60 134 286,881 –12,655 –20,744 –2,619 6,962 0.61
61 45 353,164 –13,358 –23,275 –3,503 8,107 0.49
62 33 339,196 –13,079 –21,312 –2,821 8,183 0.46
63 19 328,787 –16,543 –29,611 –2,989 8,064 0.68
64 12 258,821 –15,383 –26,945 –2,548 9,323 0.63
65 6 256,774 –16,423 –31,058 –3,554 9,961 0.68
Peak Value Option Value
10th 90th 10th 90th
Median Percentile Percentile SD Median Percentile Percentile SD
53 122 11,507 –7,517 40,915 17,456 69.40 0.56 86.71 33.17
54 123 5,415 –10,512 33,879 16,875 60.01 –0.22 75.23 31.06
55 223 2,891 –16,901 29,366 17,977 49.77 –1.03 62.91 28.96
56 188 4,854 –19,122 23,567 16,920 41.90 –1.25 51.52 22.95
57 161 9,319 –14,030 19,866 13,335 33.22 –0.39 39.80 16.04
58 149 6,135 –16,519 14,084 11,496 23.03 –0.44 28.21 10.53
59 140 4,049 –13,116 9,377 8,159 12.20 0.62 16.89 5.56
60 134 –12,655 –20,744 –2,619 6,962 0.11 –1.84 5.67 3.14
61 45 –13,358 –23,275 –3,503 8,107 0.44 –1.02 6.04 3.20
62 33 –13,079 –21,312 –2,821 8,183 0.46 –0.83 5.09 2.42
63 19 –16,543 –29,611 –2,989 8,064 –0.37 –1.29 4.35 1.85
64 12 –15,383 –26,945 –2,548 9,323 –0.50 –1.08 2.24 1.32
65 6 –16,423 –31,058 –3,554 9,961 –12.36 –14.54 –8.84 2.02
Note: N = number of observations; SD = standard deviation.men and women. In the following tables, SSW and incentive variables (IV)
amounts are given in € ten thousands and annual wages in € thousands. We
did not include lifetime earnings as suggested in the template since we
lacked appropriate data.
Models run on men or women have a quite satisfactory predictive power
(tables 4.13 and 4.14): Pseudo R2 values range from 12.5 percent to 16.2
percent with linear-age speciﬁcations, and from 23.7 percent to 26.6 per-
cent with the age-dummies speciﬁcations. The SSW variable is always sig-
niﬁcant with linear-age speciﬁcations. In models with the age-dummy
speciﬁcations, it is signiﬁcant only with the OV as IV. The coeﬃcient is al-
ways negative: The larger the SSW, the more the individual postpones re-
tirement. This result may be surprising since an increase in SSW may be
seen as a wealth eﬀect and, thus, as an incentive to increase the consump-
tion of leisure, which requires retiring earlier. Another possible explana-
tion is that highly paid people have more interesting jobs than blue-collar
workers and thus quit later.
The IV is always strongly signiﬁcant with the expected negative sign. Note
that models with OV measures provide more robust coeﬃcients for the IV,
which is consistent with our expectations: This variable contains a richer set
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Table 4.13 Probit Models (men, no full-rate dummy)
Accrual Accrual PV PV OV OV
Model Model Model Model Model Model
(linear (age (linear (age (linear (age
age) dummies) age) dummies) age) dummies)
SSW (10,000) –0.017** –0.006 –0.008** –0.002 –0.015** –0.013**
Standard deviation 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004
Implied probability 0.001 0.075 0.013 0.465 0.001 0.001
Incentive variable (10,000) –0.498** –0.212** –0.240** –0.088** –0.041** –0.035**
Standard deviation 0.031 0.035 0.020 0.020 0.003 0.003
Implied probability 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Projected earnings (1,000) 0.115 –0.117 –0.114 –0.228 0.892** 0.766**
Square of projected earnings 0.022** 0.014** 0.037** 0.019** –0.124 –0.112
Age (linear) 0.009 0.061** –0.120**
55 REF REF REF
56 0.159** 0.173** –0.052
57 –0.046 –0.043 –0.473**
58 –0.080 –0.060 –0.755**
59 –0.537** –0.554** –1.527**
60 1.214** 1.387** 0.133
61 –0.023 0.167 –1.107**
62 0.256** 0.450** –0.860**
63 0.011 0.228 –1.112**
64 0.143 0.352 –1.039**
65 1.293** 1.524 0.070
Pseudo R2 0.159** 0.240** 0.132** 0.237** 0.148** 0.256**
**Coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.of information than accrual or PV measures. The level of the coeﬃcients
does not crucially depend on the age speciﬁcation (–0.041 with linear age
versus –0.035 with age dummies for men [table 4.13] and –0.024 with linear
age versus –0.020 with age dummies for women [table 4.14]). With accrual or
PV measures, the coeﬃcient of the incentive variable is divided by 2 or 3 if
we turn from linear-age speciﬁcations to the age-dummy speciﬁcations.
Moreover, the coeﬃcient of SSW is more robust in models with OV measures
(–0.015 with linear age versus –0.013 with age dummies), whereas it becomes
insigniﬁcant in models with age dummies and accrual or PV measures.
Projected earnings are insigniﬁcant in models run on women samples.
They have a signiﬁcant positive impact on retirement for men. This result
may be surprising at ﬁrst glance since people with high earnings have, on
average, lower replacement rates (which increases the price of leisure). Two
possible explanations can be mentioned: First, highly paid people may
have saved a lot in the past and thus may quit earlier since their retirement
income has a signiﬁcant nonpension component. Second, this may reﬂect
demand-side eﬀects on the labor market. Among blue-collars, those with
the highest wages (and who may be paid far above their marginal produc-
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Table 4.14 Probit models (women, no full-rate dummy)
Accrual Accrual PV PV OV OV
Model Model Model Model Model Model
(linear (age (linear (age (linear (age
age) dummies) age) dummies) age) dummies)
SSW (10,000) –0.013** –0.005 –0.010** –0.007 –0.019** –0.019**
Standard deviation 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007
Implied probability 0.034 0.374 0.028 0.265 0.004 0.008
Incentive variable (10,000) –0.530** –0.336** –0.212** –0.136** –0.024** –0.020**
Standard deviation 0.038 0.041 0.021 0.022 0.002 0.003
Implied probability 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Projected earnings (1,000) 0.647 –0.123 0.770 0.019 1.086 1.227
Square of projected earnings –2.075 –1.174 –1.047 –0.567 –0.432 –0.814
Age (linear) 0.090** 0.094** 0.006
55 REF REF REF
56 –0.047 –0.047 –0.140
57 –0.025 –0.048 –0.256**
58 –0.098 –0.111 –0.445**
59 –0.677** –0.743** –1.224**
60 1.242** 1.318** 0.758**
61 –0.068 –0.017 –0.618**
62 0.345** 0.368** –0.274
63 0.181 0.216 –0.439**
64 0.503** 0.352** –0.330
65 2.207** 2.241** 1.561**
Pseudo R2 0.162** 0.266** 0.130** 0.258** 0.125** 0.263**
**Coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.tivity) might be more likely to be laid oﬀ by ﬁrms (through unemployment
or early retirement schemes) than those with the lowest wages.
The estimated eﬀect of age variables is uncertain. In linear-age speciﬁ-
cations, we obtain signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcients in models run with ac-
crual or PV measures (the only exception being the accrual model for
women where the coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant). This result was expected as
the disutility of work is assumed to increase with age. In models run with
OV measures, the coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant for women and signiﬁcantly
negative for men, which may be puzzling. A reason for this may be found
in unobserved individual heterogeneity on the disutility of work. Consider
two populations that only diﬀer in their disutility of work. Those who have
a large disutility of work quit early, say at sixty. At sixty-one, the OV mea-
sure of the remaining population is lower than the OV measure of the
whole population at sixty (there remain fewer years of potential continued
work), but is underestimated since the computation does not account on
the endogenous selection on the disutility of work. Nonetheless, the ob-
served retirement rate will be lower at sixty-one than at sixty since the con-
sidered population has a low disutility of work. If the economist does not
observe the disutility of work, the coeﬃcients of linear-age variables will be
signiﬁcantly negative.
The models run with age dummies exhibit an irregular proﬁle with
strong spikes at sixty and sixty-ﬁve. Three reasons may be mentioned to
explain these spikes: First, our variables do not perfectly capture incentives
associated with SS rules. Second, these spikes may reﬂect demand-side
eﬀects: our incentives sum up supply-side eﬀects, but employers are al-
lowed to lay oﬀ workers as soon as they reach the full rate, mostly at sixty
or sixty-ﬁve. Third, people may be induced to retire at sixty or sixty-ﬁve by
a sort of social habit: sixty has been the normal retirement age since 1983,
and sixty-ﬁve was the normal retirement age until 1983.
We also computed models with an early retirement, for civil servants, or
a full-rate, for the private sector (early retirement/full-rate) dummy (tables
4.15 and 4.16): for civil servants this dummy is set to 1 if the agents’ age is
the minimum legal age to claim SS beneﬁts (ﬁfty-ﬁve or sixty, depending on
his occupation) and to 0 otherwise. In the private sector, since claiming SS
beneﬁts is strongly discouraged below the full rate (virtually nobody claims
SS beneﬁts at a reduced rate, table 4.8), the dummy is set to one if the agent
reaches the ﬁrst year he can claim full-rate SS beneﬁts. This dummy is
strongly signiﬁcant with linear age speciﬁcations and increases the pseudo
R2 that now reaches from 14.0 percent to 19.0 percent. But with age dum-
mies speciﬁcations, it does not really improve the pseudo R2 and is not sig-
niﬁcant in models run on males.
To sum up, these estimations provide a satisfactory description of retire-
ment behavior: The coeﬃcients on incentive variables are always signiﬁ-
cant with the expected sign. The impact of SSW on the retirement decision
Estimating Models of Retirement Behavior on French Data 263is more diﬃcult to analyze. The explanatory power of these models is
pretty good since pseudo R2 values range from 12.5 percent to 26.6 per-
cent, which is relatively satisfactory with individual data. The PV models
are clearly dominated by accrual models. The comparison of OV models
with accrual models is less straightforward: On the one side, OV models
mostly provide lower pseudo R2 values than accrual models, but on the
other side, the coeﬃcient on the IV appears to be more robust to any
change in speciﬁcation (linear age versus age dummies, for instance) in OV
models than in accrual models.
These estimations were performed with incentive variables including
part of the incentives associated with early retirement or unemployment
schemes. But our speciﬁcation very poorly accounts for the discrepancy in
access probabilities to these schemes. In particular, we use sector-speciﬁc
access probabilities, whereas access probabilities are basically ﬁrm spe-
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Table 4.15 Probit Models (men, full-rate dummy)
Accrual Accrual PV PV OV OV
Model Model Model Model Model Model
(linear (age (linear (age (linear (age
age) dummies) age) dummies) age) dummies)
SSW (10,000) –0.016** –0.006 –0.007** –0.002 –0.014** –0.013**
Standard deviation 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004
Implied probability 0.001 0.077 0.024 0.471 0.001 0.001
Incentive variable (10,000) –0.463** –0.208** –0.211** –0.085** –0.038** –0.036**
Standard deviation 0.031 0.035 0.021 0.020 0.003 0.003
Implied probability 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Early retirement/full rate
dummy 0.651** 0.142 0.753** 0.155 0.639** –0.113
Standard deviation 0.095 0.108 0.094 0.108 0.095 0.112
Implied probability 0.001 0.187 0.001 0.148 0.001 0.001
Projected earnings (1,000) 0.112 –0.120 –0.118 –0.231 0.822** 0.791**
Square of projected earnings 0.021** 0.014** 0.033** 0.019** –0.115 –0.115
Age (linear) 0.006 0.057** –0.111**
55 REF REF REF
56 0.169** 0.184** –0.066
57 –0.037 –0.033 –0.490**
58 –0.071 –0.049 –0.778**
59 –0.529** –0.543** –1.556**
60 1.199** 1.369** 0.119
61 –0.006 0.184 –1.146**
62 0.274 0.468** –0.901**
63 0.029 0.245 –1.153**
64 0.164 0.373** –1.084**
65 1.217** 1.438** 0.106
Pseudo R2 0.164** 0.240** 0.140** 0.237** 0.153** 0.257**
**Coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.ciﬁc. But we lack appropriate ﬁrm data to model this phenomenon. We
performed some other regressions including only SS incentives into incen-
tive variables (access probabilities are set equal to 0). The predictive power
of these models is not really weaker than the predictive power of the ﬁrst
regressions: Our attempt to account for incentives associated with early re-
tirement or unemployment schemes is not conclusive.
4.6 Simulations
Two reforms are simulated in this section.
• The three-year-increase reform shifts the minimum age to claim SS
beneﬁts to sixty-three. The full rate is obtained if people have worked
at least 162 quarters (instead of 150) or if they are sixty-eight. Access
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Table 4.16 Probit Models (women, full-rate dummy)
Accrual Accrual PV PV OV OV
Model Model Model Model Model Model
(linear (age (linear (age (linear (age
age) dummies) age) dummies) age) dummies)
SSW (10,000) –0.014** –0.006 –0.016** –0.008 –0.019** –0.019**
Standard deviation 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007
Implied probability 0.018 0.305 0.014 0.212 0.005 0.010
Incentive variable (10,000) –0.475** –0.329** –0.183** –0.132** –0.020** –0.019**
Standard deviation 0.039 0.041 0.022 0.022 0.002 0.003
Implied probability 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Early retirement/full rate 
dummy 0.999* 0.308** 1.086** 0.328** 1.056** 0.226**
Standard deviation 0.095 0.112 0.094 0.111 0.093 0.112
Implied probability 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.044
Projected earnings (1,000) 1.167 –0.026 1.292 0.150 1.370 1.188
Square of projected earnings –2.539 –1.236 –1.616 –0.653 –0.875 –0.809
Age (linear) 0.072** 0.076** 0.001
55 REF REF REF
56 –0.011 –0.009 –0.108
57 0.007 –0.013 –0.221**
58 –0.064 –0.074 –0.403**
59 –0.063** –0.704** –1.173**
60 1.194** 1.266** 0.751**
61 –0.037 0.014 –0.565**
62 0.371** 0.394** –0.222
63 0.212 0.248 –0.383
64 0.517** 0.371** –0.281
65 1.958** 1.981** 1.416**
Pseudo R2 0.190** 0.267** 0.164** 0.260** 0.160** 0.263**
**Coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.probabilities to unemployment or early retirement schemes are incre-
mented by three years (access to these schemes is therefore impossible
before ﬁfty-eight.
• The common reform allows people to claim SS beneﬁts from sixty.
Claiming SS beneﬁts at sixty-ﬁve provides a 60 percent replacement
rate. The pension is decreased or increased by 6 percent per year be-
low or above sixty-ﬁve, respectively. Access to early retirement or un-
employment schemes is impossible.
Figure 4.2 displays actual retirement rates for men and women and the
proﬁle provided with the OV model if the age dummies are the only source
of variation: The data show pretty high retirement rates until ﬁfty-nine
(about 15 percent) and large spikes at sixty and sixty-ﬁve—but the latter
only concerns a minority since most people quit before sixty-one. For each
reform and each speciﬁcation (accrual, PV, and OV), three simulations are
performed (S1, S2, and S3):
• S1 is the simulation performed with linear age;
• S2 uses the results of the model run with age dummies without modi-
fying the dummies;
• S3 uses the results of the model run with age dummies, but we modify
the dummies in a “plausible” way. In the three-year increase reform,
dummies are incremented by three years so that, for example, the age-
ﬁfty-eight dummy in the simulation is the estimated age-ﬁfty-ﬁve
dummy. In the common reform, dummies are the estimated dummies
at sixty and at sixty-ﬁve (spikes at sixty and sixty-ﬁve are assumed to
account for early and normal retirement). Between sixty-one and




Figures 4.3, 4.4,and 4.5show the S1 results. Simulations performed with
the accrual speciﬁcation show a translation to the right of the graph: Be-
fore the minimum age to claim SS beneﬁts—now sixty-three—the average
increase in the pension caused by a one-year delay remains almost un-
changed (it is unchanged for short careers, which cannot reach the full rate
in any case, and for long careers, which already have 162 quarters). The
age-sixty spike is thus moved to sixty-three, but the average age of retire-
ment is only increased by 0.42 years since retirement rates between ﬁfty-
ﬁve and sixty-two remain pretty high (see table 4.17). This reﬂects the fact
that we were not able to accurately model eligibility to early retirement
beneﬁts: As a result, the constant in the probit regression is likely to be
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Fig. 4.2 Male retirement rates: A, Actual retirement rates; B, Dummies proﬁle
Note: In this ﬁgure, we compare actual retirement rates for men with the simulated eﬀect of
age dummies on retirement rates. We ﬁxed all other variables (SSW, option, earnings, etc.) to
their mean sample value, and we use the estimated coeﬃcients of the OV model (with age
dummies) to assess the eﬀect of age dummies. This helps us to understand which part of the
ﬁt is explained by the dummies.
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Fig. 4.3 S1 men: A, Accrual, hazard; B, Accrual, cumulative
overestimated and the coeﬃcient on accrual underestimated, and the sim-
ulated impact of the reform is weak since the constant remains unchanged
in the simulation. The eﬀect before sixty is a bit larger with the PV speciﬁ-
cation: At age ﬁfty-ﬁve, people realize that they may enjoy early retirement
or unemployment beneﬁts if they wait until ﬁfty-eight (since access to these
schemes is now impossible before age ﬁfty-eight), which pulls down retire-ment rates (this fact is not captured by the accrual speciﬁcation). The av-
erage retirement age grows by 1.39 years.
The eﬀect is the largest with the OV speciﬁcation. Two reasons for this
may be mentioned: First, the OV measure is more appropriate since it in-
cludes not only the SSW, but also the wage component. This is an incentive
to delay more retirement, since people do not want to stay several years
without wage or pension income: Retirement rates are thus lower before
sixty-three. Second, the problematic decreasing age proﬁle, as previously
discussed, explains that the age-sixty-three spike (three-year-increase re-
form) is lower than the age sixty spike (baseline). This latter fact explains
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Fig. 4.4 S1 men: A, PV, hazard; B, PV, cumulativewhy the average retirement age increases by 3.14 years (a ﬁgure above 3 is
of course doubtful).
Model S2
Figures 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 show the S2 results (age dummies not incre-
mented). Since age dummies remain unchanged, retirement rates remain
close to the baseline case for accrual or PV speciﬁcations (with a slight de-
crease in the age-sixty spike since people do not reach the full rate at that
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Fig. 4.5 S1 men: A, OV, hazard; B, OV, cumulativeEstimating Models of Retirement Behavior on French Data 271
Table 4.17 Average Retirement Age, Baseline, and Simulations
Men Women
Three-Year Common Three-Year Common
Increase Reform Reform Increase Reform Reform
Baseline 58.64 58.64 58.85 58.85
Accrual
S1 59.06 57.60 — —
S2 58.85 58.23 — —
S3 59.16 58.32 — —
PV
S1 60.03 57.68 — —
S2 59.17 58.27 — —
S3 59.64 58.40 — —
OV
S1 61.78 60.20 60.43 59.32
S2 61.39 59.88 60.17 59.14
S3 60.50 59.95 59.97 59.28
Note: Dashes indicate that data is not available.
age). We do not observe any spike at sixty-three (although a majority of
people can claim full rate SS beneﬁts from sixty-three) since the age-sixty-
three dummy is quite low. The increase in the average retirement age is thus
only 0.21 and 0.53 years with the Accrual PV speciﬁcations, respectively.
But the decrease in the age-sixty spike (and even in retirement rates before
sixty) is far larger with the OV speciﬁcation since the model captures the
fact that people have no income for three years if they stop immediately.
The average retirement age increases by 2.75 years.
Model S3
Figures 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11show the S3 results. Since age dummies are in-
cremented by three years, retirement rates are more or less shifted by three
years to the right for accrual or PV speciﬁcations. The increase in the av-
erage retirement age is 0.52, 1.00, and 1.86 years with the Accrual, PV, and
OV speciﬁcations, respectively. Once again, the eﬀect is larger with the OV
speciﬁcation because this more forward-looking measure accounts for the
fact that people include not only the SSW but also the wage component in
making their decisions.
One unexpected result should be pointed out: In OV speciﬁcations, the
increase in the average retirement age is larger with model S2 than S3 (it is
the opposite with accrual or PV speciﬁcations). This is the result of the
globally decreasing age proﬁle in OV speciﬁcations (not only with linear
age, but also with age dummies). In model S2, the simulated retirement rate
at ﬁfty-eight is computed with the age-ﬁfty-eight dummy, which is quite
low, and thus explains a very low probability of exit. In model S3, this sim-ulation is performed with the age ﬁfty-ﬁve dummy, which is much larger,
and the simulated retirement rate is thus higher.
4.6.2 Common Reform
Model S1
Accrual and PV speciﬁcations provide very ﬂat retirement rates (ﬁgures
4.3 and 4.4). This is the expected outcome of introducing an actuarially fair
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Fig. 4.6 S2 men: A, Accrual, hazard; B, Accrual, cumulativepension scheme: the level of SSW is more or less the same, whatever the age
of people who claim SS beneﬁts. The accrual and PV measures are thus
close to zero, and the annual retirement rates constant at pretty high levels:
the average retirement age decreases by 1.04 and 0.96 years) with the ac-
crual and PV speciﬁcations, respectively.
The OV measure seems more appropriate: Even if the age proﬁle of
SSW is ﬂat, people may prefer to have a wage income until sixty instead
of nothing if they quit earlier (ﬁgure 4.5). The retirement rate thus in-
creases with age but is lower (by about 10 points) than in the baseline case
since people are sensitive to SS incentives. After age sixty, retirement rates
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Fig. 4.7 S2 men: A, PV, hazard; B, PV, cumulativeare ﬂat (the increase in the pension in case of continued work is oﬀset by
the loss of leisure). The average retirement age increases by 1.56 years,
which is more likely than the results obtained with accrual or PV speciﬁ-
cations.
Model S2
As in the 3-year increase reform case, retirement rates remain relatively
close to the baseline case, but at a slightly lower level with accrual and PV
speciﬁcations (ﬁgures 4.6 and 4.7). In the baseline case, a minority of
people could enjoy in increase in their SSW if they stayed one year or more
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Fig. 4.8 S2 men: A, OV, hazard; B, OV, cumulativeon the labor market. Things are now diﬀerent: SSW is more or less con-
stant and retirement rates thus increase. The average retirement age de-
creases by 0.41 and 0.37 years with the accrual and PV speciﬁcations, re-
spectively.
The results are somewhat diﬀerent with the OV speciﬁcation: Retire-
ment rates before sixty now decrease, in comparison with the baseline case,
since people prefer to avoid a situation where they have no income until
sixty (ﬁgure 4.8). The average retirement age increases by 1.24 years, which
is the expected sign, but the eﬀect remains moderate.
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Fig. 4.9 S3 men: A, Accrual, hazard; B, Accrual, cumulativeModel S3
Results are very close to those obtained with model S2 since age dum-
mies are not changed between ﬁfty-ﬁve and sixty (ﬁgures 4.9, 4.10, and
4.11). Age dummies are somewhat lower than in model S2 between sixty-
one and sixty-four, but this only concerns the minority of people who are
still working at sixty-one. With accrual and PV speciﬁcations, the average
retirement age decreases by 0.32 and 0.24 years, respectively. With the OV
speciﬁcation, it increases by 1.30 years.
4.6.3 Comparison of the Diﬀerent Speciﬁcations—The Case of Women
The current structure of SS incentives induces high retirement rates
when people get the full rate (mostly at sixty). At that age, the level of ac-
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Fig. 4.10 S3 men: A, PV, hazard; B, PV, cumulativecrual suddenly falls for most agents. This explains the very high explana-
tory power of the accrual speciﬁcation (greater than the explanatory power
of the OV speciﬁcation, although the latter approach is richer). But while
analyzing the impact of changes in the computation of pensions, the OV
speciﬁcation proved to be more appropriate. In particular, enforcing the
common reform (with an increase of incentives to postpone retirement af-
ter sixty for a majority and the suppression of early retirement schemes)
should logically induce a decrease in retirement rates before sixty. This is
not the case with accrual or PV speciﬁcations.
We thus chose to present simulations performed with the OV speciﬁca-
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Fig. 4.11 S3 men: A, OV, hazard; B, OV, cumulativetion for women (ﬁgures 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14). For women, the only draw-
back of the OV speciﬁcation should disappear. With men the negative
coeﬃcient on linear age (and the decreasing proﬁle of age dummies) were
puzzling and led to an excessive simulated impact of the three-year in-
crease reform (see previous). This should not be the case for women since
the coeﬃcient on linear age is insigniﬁcant in the OV speciﬁcation.
The three-year increase reform would involve an increase by 1.58, 1.32,
and 1.12 years of the average retirement age for women with model S1, S2,
and S3, respectively. With the common reform, as expected, the eﬀect is
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Fig. 4.12 S1 women: A, OV, hazard; B, OV, cumulativesmaller: The average retirement age increases by 0.47, 0.29, and 0.43 years
with model S1, S2 and S3.
4.7 Conclusion
This project allowed us to assess the sensitivity of individual retirement
behavior to the structure of SS incentives. Of course, the robustness of
these results may be in question for mainly two reasons:
• First, precisely estimating this sensitivity is diﬃcult since the strength
of current incentives in France deeply limits the heterogeneity of be-
haviors in available data;
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Fig. 4.13 S2 women: A, OV, hazard; B, OV, cumulative• Second, current behaviors strongly reﬂect demand-side eﬀects on the
labor market that our supply-side approach cannot capture. In partic-
ular, access to early retirement or unemployment schemes is very im-
perfectly modeled.
Nonetheless we performed various regressions that provide a quite sat-
isfactory description of the behaviors observed in our sample. Sensitivity
analysis (through the simulation of alternative rules for the computation of
pensions) showed that the OV model (which accounts not only for the pure
SSW, but also for the wage component of incentives) seems more appro-
priate to simulate policy changes. The simulation of individual behaviors
under such changes showed a relatively important sensitivity to policy
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Fig. 4.14 S3 women: A, OV, hazard; B, OV, cumulativechanges since, for example, an increase by three years of all important pa-
rameters (minimum age to claim SS beneﬁts and tenure required to get the
full rate) could induce an increase by between one and two years of the av-
erage retirement age (results obtained with the OV speciﬁcation).
Appendix
Wage Projections
As stated above, our only requirement for wages is their extrapolation at
later ages, starting at age ﬁfty-ﬁve. This is done through the estimation of
wage equations. Even if the analysis will only apply to cohort 1930, wage
equations have been estimated using all the information available, that is,
data taken from DADS for all cohorts of the EIR (1926, 1930, 1932, 1934,
1936, 1938, 1940, and 1942): This corresponds to 207,433 observations
(33,535 individuals) over the time period 1985–1996 (with one missing
point in 1990).
Of course, wage equations are estimated on annualized wages, not on the
basis of wages eﬀectively earned by people belonging to these cohorts (to
avoid the downward bias that would result from exits from the labor force
during the year). This is done by dividing wages eﬀectively earned by du-
ration of pay and remultiplying the result by 360. This does not avoid a cer-
tain number of imperfections: Some people go on receiving very small
wages at later ages, sometimes after the liquidation of their pensions (this
is allowed within rather narrow limits). When the duration of pay is poorly
registered (for instance, when it is declared to be 360 days while it is obvi-
ously less), this method leads to a very low level of the annualized wage
which is going to bias the estimation of wage equations.
To avoid these imperfections, a somewhat arbitrary test is applied: Ob-
servations with an annualized wage lower than 90 percent of the annual
minimum wage (salaire minimum interprofessionnel de croissance; SMIC)
for a full-time job have been dropped from the sample. Once this is done,
there remains 175,109 observations (29,483 individuals), that is, a sample
size reduced by 15.6 percent.
Estimations are then performed on 1985–1995: This reduces once more
the size of the sample, which is now composed of 165,530 observations.
Observations for 1996 are left for out-of-sample tests of the accuracy of
projections, the criterion for these tests being the mean or median squared
error.
Four alternative methods have been attempted for the projection of
wages.
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that wages are constant in real terms (i.e., a 2 percent increase in nomi-
nal terms between 1995 and 1996).
Method A2 estimates wage equations without individual ﬁxed eﬀects.
Wages are then projected, at the individual level, by applying the varia-
tion predicted by wage equations to the last known wage for 1995. Two
subpossibilities have been explored for the estimation of wage equations:
Method A21 estimates the wage equation on ﬁrst order diﬀerences; and
Method A22 estimates on levels (using logs).
Method B estimates wage equations on levels but with individual ﬁxed
eﬀects. The estimated average age proﬁle is ﬂattened after age ﬁfty, and
individual eﬀects are added to this proﬁle to give expected wage proﬁles
for individuals after this age.
Method C is a variant of the simple method A1 and the extrapolation of
the average wage over the last three years.
The equations adjusted for methods A21, A22, or B are for the models
in levels
Y t   F(Xt, age, agesq, Y t 1, Y t 2, Y t 1   age, Y t 2   age, Y t 1   agesq, Y t 2
  agesq, timet),
or for models on diﬀerences
 Y t   F(Xt, age, agesq,  Y t 1,  Y t 2,  Y t 1   age,  Y t 2   age,  Y t 1
  agesq,  Y t 2   agesq, timet),
with Y t being the log of wages, Xt a set of explanatory variables including a
dummy for people living in or around Paris, a dummy for the socioprofes-
sional group in four groups, and a dummy for the kind of activity (in six-
teen groups). Equations have been estimated separately for each gender.
A problem is that the estimations of these equations require the knowl-
edge of four successive years if the model is in diﬀerences, or three succes-
sive years if the model is in levels. Four successive years are also needed
with method C. Yet many individuals are not observed during four con-
secutive years. In particular, cohort 1930, the one to which the model is go-
ing to be applied, is not observed before age ﬁfty-ﬁve. Of course, at least
when the model is in diﬀerences, the knowledge of past wages is not ab-
solutely necessary if we want to use the model for projections, since we can
limit ourselves to applying the age proﬁle derived from the equation. But it
is nevertheless a problem to drop people with short wage records from the
sample: It may bias results since these people are less likely to have had
good performances in terms of wage progression.
Models ﬁrst have been estimated as initially proposed (on a subsample
of people working three consecutive years), and then reestimated by pro-
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model in levels, we have successively estimated
Y t   F(Xt, age, agesq, Y t 1, Y t 1   age, Y t 1   agesq, timet),
and
Y t   F(Xt, age, agesq, timet).
Table 4A.1 shows the resulting quality of wage predictions for all ﬁve
methods with a varying number of lags (irrelevant cases are left empty). Re-
sults are given both for the total population, and for full-time workers only.
The simplest of all methods, method A1 does not perform so badly. Its
variant method C does not add any improvement. Method B does not per-
form very well, especially for men. It is diﬃcult to compare methods A21
and A22. Wage equations estimated on levels perform signiﬁcantly better
if the criterion if the median of squared errors. Another criterion for selec-
tion is the examination of resulting age proﬁles for wages. The proﬁles are
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Table 4A.1 Out of Sample Wage Projections for 1996
Men (no. of lags) Women (no. of lags)
0 year 1 year 2 years 0 year 1 year 2 years
All Workers   55a
A1 (last wage) 0.1450 0.0959
0.0037 0.0018
A21 (wage equation, diﬀerences) 0.1454 0.1230 0.1206 0.0956 0.0813 0.1011
0.0054 0.0056 0.0059 0.0034 0.0028 0.0045
A22 (wage equation, levels) 0.1447 0.1447 0.1443 0.0953 0.0928 0.0904
0.0036 0.0052 0.0040 0.0021 0.0042 0.0017
B (wage equations, with ﬁxed eﬀects) 0.1465 0.1520 0.1436 0.1031 0.0937 0.0931
0.0241 0.0133 0.0083 0.0125 0.0039 0.0041
C (average wage of last 3 years) 0.1510 0.1380
0.0042 0.0029
Full-Time Workers   55b
A1 (last wage) 0.1246 0.0899
0.0026 0.0014
A21 (wage equation, diﬀerences) 0.1239 0.1005 0.1010 0.0885 0.0785 0.0984
0.0053 0.0051 0.0048 0.0030 0.0023 0.0039
A22 (wage equation, levels) 0.1235 0.1257 0.1260 0.0888 0.0865 0.0859
0.0032 0.0041 0.0029 0.0015 0.0042 0.0020
B (wage equations, with ﬁxed eﬀects) 0.1177 0.1333 0.1179 0.0953 0.0892 0.0785
0.0189 0.0132 0.0068 0.0018 0.0031 0.0037
C (average wage of last 3 years) 0.1365 0.1322
0.0031 0.0023
Note: Estimation period: 1985–1995, 1990 missing. Blank cells indicate that data is not relevant.
aMean squared errors.
bMedian squared errors.convex and rapidly increasing when diﬀerences are modeled. They look
more satisfactory when wage equations are estimated on levels. On the
whole, the choice is between methods A1 and A22. The same conclusion
can be reached if we restrict ourselves to the subsample of full-time work-
ers. Method A22, without lagged income, is the one which has been ﬁnally
preferred.
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